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Abstract
Cases the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) pursues against the directors
and officers of failed commercial banks for (gross) negligence are important for the corpo-
rate governance of U.S. commercial banks. These cases shape the kernel of bank corporate
governance, as they guide expectations of bankers and regulators. Ours is the first empir-
ical study of such legal cases that define the limits of acceptable behavior under financial
distress. We examine the differences in behavior of all 408 U.S. commercial banks that were
taken into receivership between 2007–2012. Sued banks had different balance sheet dynam-
ics in the three years prior to failure. These generally larger banks were faster growing,
obtained riskier funding and were more “optimistic”. We find evidence that the behavior
of bank boards adjusts in an out-of-sample set of banks. Our results suggest the FDIC does
not only pursue “deep pockets”, but sets corporate governance standards for all banks by
suing negligent directors and officers.
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1 Corporate Governance and Shareholder Litigation
We contribute to the empirical corporate governance literature on commercial banks by focus-
ing on an important mechanism for disciplining directors: The threat of legal action. Corpo-
rate governance is concerned with the actions of the board of directors and their alignment
with the interests of the shareholders. The institutional framework of corporate governance
extends as far as shareholder litigation against directors and officers. We examine the failures
of U.S. commercial banks during the Global Financial Crisis for evidence how a regulator,
as receiver – and thus acting on behalf of shareholders – pursues litigation cases against the
“right” directors and officers.
In order for litigation to serve as a deterrent to poor corporate governance, it must be
possible ex ante for directors and officers, and especially directors, to be aware of potential
financial distress. We examine a list of financial indicators, the “director’s dozen” (see Table 1)
from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) guide for new directors, for evidence
that the FDIC sues directors and officers for negligence that could be foreseen.
We empirically investigate the litigation strategy of the regulator (FDIC) when pursuing the
bank directors and officers of failed U.S. commercial banks. If the FDIC is primarily interested
in recovering losses it will likely only pursue “deep pockets”. If, on the other hand, the FDIC
also sees value in improving banks’ governance, it will pursue directors in a systematic fashion
reflecting poor governance. We find evidence that the directors and officers of US commercial
banks who are pursued for “negligence” are those who have engaged in risky behaviour. We
find regardless of the recovery potential, that is there is no “too-small-to-get-sued”.
We contribute to two different literatures. The first is the corporate governance of banks
literature, specifically after the Global Financial Crisis. The second is the use of shareholder
lawsuits to influence corporate governance. Our paper is the first to show a link between
shareholder litigation and changes in the corporate governance of other banks. The actions of
the FDIC as a receiver are at an interesting nexus given its dual role as one of the three U.S.
banks’ regulators and receiver, thus acting on behalf of shareholders.
The corporate governance of banks is complicated as noted by Mehran, Morrison, and
Shapiro (2011). Banks are highly leveraged and very complex. Moreover, banks have multi-
ple stakeholders such as depositors, creditors, and the government itself – on the one hand,
in its explicit role as the backstop for deposit guarantees and, on the other hand, in a more
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implicit role involving idiosyncratic or aggregate risk-transfers, because of the potential for a
dysfunctional banking and financial system to cause large economic contractions. The average
financial firm has 90% debt and investment banks 95% debt (Bolton, Mehran, and Shapiro,
2015). The board of the bank only represents the views of shareholders and not other stake-
holders, see for example Easterbrook and Fischel (1983). A growing literature shows the effect
boards have on the performance of firms. De Andres and Vallelado (2008) show that larger
and not excessively independent boards might prove more efficient in monitoring and ad-
vising functions, and create more value for commercial banks. Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt
(2003) highlight the importance of the board and the audit committee in preventing earnings
management.
The literature on shareholder lawsuits is primarily, but not limited to, legal literature: Cof-
fee (1986), Romano (1991), Hertzel and Smith (1993). The role of shareholder litigation in the
disciplining of directors is far more heterogeneous for non-bank firms since board decisions
cannot so readily be linked to explicitly measurable indicators of competence. It is thus diffi-
cult to tie the threat of shareholder suits to directors’ decisions and thus corporate governance.
However, it is possible to show that litigation leads to shifts in corporate governance. Ferris
et al. (2007) examine the effects of derivative shareholder suits on corporate governance and
find evidence that the suits lead to significant improvements in the board of directors.
In the realm of corporate governance literature on banking specifically, many papers tackle
the financial crisis. Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2012) find in an international sample that firms
with more independent boards experienced worse stock returns due to the raising of equity
capital during the crisis and that firms with higher institutional ownership took more risk
prior to the crisis. Firms’ risk management policies have a significant impact on the effect
of the crisis on firms (Brunnermeier, 2009), and cost-benefit trade-offs made by shareholders
and boards determined the risk management policies (Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2008). This
suggests that corporate governance affects banks’ performance.
At the nexus between regulators and corporate governance, Macey and O’Hara (2003)
argue for explicitly forcing directors of banks to take cognizance of the effect of decisions on
the safety and solvency of the bank. Historically, bank boards have a duty of care and a duty
of loyalty to the corporation. The U.S. case law on the duty of care of directors can be taken
back to Briggs vs. Spaulding, a 19th century case hinging on the lack of oversight of a corrupt
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bank CEO. The court held that the “directors must exercise ordinary care and prudence in
the administration of the affairs of a bank ... something more than officiating as figure-heads."
Directors of depository institutions must exercise “ordinary care" in conducting the affairs of a
bank. This has become a Federal common law standard for the duty of care. The duty of care
requires that directors exercise reasonable care, prudence, and diligence in the management of
the corporation. Director liability for a breach of the duty of care may arise from negligence in
decision making. But historically courts have chosen to limit the possibility that directors may
be pursued for “honest, but mistaken judgment calls" (McCoy, 1996), the courts have chosen
to try to avoid judging decisions retrospectively. This is known as the Business Judgment Rule.
The Business Judgment Rule means that courts will find in favor of directors if they acted
in good faith, on an informed basis and in the honest belief that it was taken in the best
interest of the company. Courts take a generous view of the Business Judgment Rule, with the
presumption in favour of the directors if the decision making process is deemed to be of the
“appropriate" standard.
Macey and O’Hara (2003) note that the willingness of the regulators and the courts to
respect the Business Judgment Rule follows a cyclical pattern. During or immediately after a
major crisis courts raise the standard of care required of bank directors. They point to the 1940
case of Litwin vs. Allen as an example of a higher duty of care levied on bank directors. Then
in the 1950s and 1960s, the Business Judgment Rule was found to justify “delinquent loan
renewals, nonexistent underwriting standards, and absent internal controls” (McCoy, 1996).
The Savings and Loans (S&L) crisis of the 1980s brought new legislation and litigation. The
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) set a Federal
standard of care. The U.S. Supreme Court in 1997 settled the competing Federal and State
laws and the common law standards in Atherton vs. FDIC, holding that the higher standard
of Briggs was superceded by FIRREA, which set the “floor" of litigation in the form of the
gross negligence standard and that it was possible for states to set higher standards such as
mere negligence.1
If the FDIC is engaging in cases against directors on the basis that in a period prior to the
takeover by the FDIC the board could have predicted financial distress, we would de facto be
1Note that Federal law already holds that directors and officers of the bank owe a duty of care to depositors
as well as shareholders. By itself this does not mean that directors and officers owe a duty of care to the regulator
or to consider the safety and solvency of the financial institution, but allows depositors to sue in the event that
they suffer an injury uncommon to other depositors. See Zajac (1992) note 32 and note 34.
5
close to the standard of care that is suggested by Macey and O’Hara (2003).
Legal action against board directors acts in two ways. Firstly it affects compensation of
directors, as they may be financially liable for some or all of the damages and the costs of the
legal action. Secondly, it has a negative reputational impact, which reduces directors’ future
opportunities to become directors and their earnings. The role of compensation in motivating
agents is well established, see Hölmstrom (1979), Shavell (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983).
Reputational concerns can be found in Fama (1980) and tested empirically in Gilson (1990) and
Kaplan and Reishus (1990), who find that poorly performing CEOs are less likely to receive
external directorships. Fich and Shivdasani (2007) examine the effect on directors’ reputations
if they sit on the boards of firms that are the subject of shareholder lawsuits alleging financial
fraud, they find that such directors are more likely to lose their other board seats.
We base our analysis on FDIC decisions to authorise litigation against directors and officers
and on settlements of such cases. These come to 161 cases out of 408 failures. We limit our
analysis to banks that failed prior to June 2012. This is because the FDIC faces, in general, a
three year window in which to file cases.2 We limit the actions to FDIC tort claims against
directors and officers, avoiding other claims such as contractual claims or claims against third
parties.3 We choose these legal actions because they are not criminal charges or administrative
penalties and thus can be seen as part of the corporate governance of the firm.4
An alternate view of why the FDIC sues directors and officers can be found in the popular
and trade press. Sclafane (2011) writes “one former banking regulator said the existence of
D&O insurance is the starting point for FDIC officials when they evaluate whether or not to file
the suits ... “All the banking agencies are going to be bringing actions against deep pockets’".
Howard (2010) notes "[n]ow, the FDIC may again be looking at D&O insurance as a resource
for replenishing at least a portion of the government’s losses resulting from the recent spate
of bank failures." The Towers Watson “Directors’ and Officers’ liability survey 2010 summary
of results" for 2009 shows financial services - excluding insurance, have median coverage of
$30 million and mean coverage of $81.7 million, the 25th percentile is $20 million and 75th
percentile is $100 million.
2Lawsuits can be filed after three years if a “tolling" agreement is in place that allows the regulator to delay
the decision on litigation.
3See Bernstein, Oller, and Matelis (2009) for further discussion of financial institution litigation.
4For the criminal charges and the administrative penalties available to the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, see OCC (2012) pages 88-105.
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Given the extensive nature of the D&O insurance is it fair to assume that there is a com-
pensation element to the incentives on bank directors?5 Firstly, in several cases the FDIC has
successfully forced directors to contribute to the settlement.6 Secondly, the threat of personal
liability is taken seriously by bank directors; a recent survey by the American Association of
Bank Directors (2014) found that 19 out of 80 banks surveyed had directors who had resigned
due to a fear of personal liability or had a person refuse to become a director for fear of
personal liability.
AABD (2014) suggests that the “heart of these suits – virtually all of them against former
directors of community banks – is the approval by the board or board committee of a handful
of large loans that caused losses contributing to the bank’s failure, many in reliance on the
recommendations of the loan and/or credit officers of the bank. Many of the suits single out
directors who served on the Board Loan Committee. ... Directors who acted in good faith
should not be sued."
Anecdotal evidence suggests that directors do worry about their personal wealth and their
reputation, as well as questioning whether the FDIC is overreaching by litigating with the
benefit of hindsight – ignoring the Business Judgment Rule: Engen (2012) quotes Michael
Perry, former Chairman and Chief executive of Indymac: “On his blog, nottoobigtofail.org,
he charges that the FDIC is ‘inappropriately seeking to blame banking executives like me for
[its] own failures,’ while also lamenting how the suit is damaging his reputation, finances
and career...’Even if you accept all of the FDIC’s factual allegations against me as true ... I
am protected by the business judgment rule, which prohibits imposing personal liability on
directors and officers for ordinary negligence’".
Thus we find competing theories about why the FDIC may choose to litigate: to prevent
gambling for resurrection (Macey and O’Hara, 2003) or to go after the “deep pockets" of the
insurers.
5A substantial literature addresses the availability of D&O liability insurance and corporate governance. We
do not address this literature directly, although it is possible that the FDIC chooses to go after “deep pockets" of
banks with more D&O insurance. Baker and Griffith (2007) find that D&O insurers do not monitor the risks taken
by firms and the corporate governance of firms. This means that the directors, knowing that they are protected
by D&O insurance, do not engage in active corporate governance. This contrasts with Holderness (1990) who
posited the role of insurers as monitors.
6In the Downey Savings failure, Maurice McAlister, the former chairman, agreed to make a contribution
of $1.93 million, and other directors agreed to contribute a further US$1.7 million. This was small relative
to the D&O insurance contribution of $28.4 million. See https://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/plsa/ca_
downeymcalisterrosenthalgatzke.pdf
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The subsequent section 2 describes the underlying bank level data used in our examination.
The next section 3 discusses our empirical methods. After that we present our empirical results
in section 4 and a range of robustness checks in section 5. Finally, we conclude in section 6.
2 U.S. Bank Level and FDIC Law Suits Data
Our empirical analysis combines publically available litigation data released by the FDIC as
well as panel data of regulatory filings on U.S. commercial banks. We employ the FDIC’s pro-
fessional liability lawsuit list7 of Directors and Officers (D&O) cases and professional liability
settlement agreements8 (where there is a D&O participation in the settlement) to create a list
of banks subject to litigation. We do not remove cases where the case has come to trial and the
defendants have won since our interest is in what cases the FDIC chooses to bring.
The financial factors are based on the quarterly Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council reports on condition and income (“Call Reports”), Forms FFIEC 031 or 041 depending
on whether they have foreign offices. It is a requirement that in addition to the CFO of the
bank signing the report, at least two members of the board should co-sign, if the bank is a
state non-member bank, three directors have to co-sign for all other types of banks. The Call
Reports are required to be filed within 30 days of the quarter end. The Call Reports are thus a
reasonable basis on which to consider whether the board of directors should have been aware
of potential financial distress – as members of the board are required to attest to the correctness
of the report and that they had examined the report.
We adjust for the likelihood that a bank will be subject to litigation based on the level of
negligence that the FDIC must prove for their litigation. Some states have clear simple negli-
gence standards, whilst others hew to the gross negligence (or de facto follow this standard
based on the use of the Business Judgment Rule).9
Table 2 shows the number of bank failures and the number of banks sued over time. It
also shows the number of “tolling agreements" that allow banks to extend the 3 year statute
of limitation on tort cases. The mean length of time before a suit is filed is just under 2 years
and 4 months (18 months excluding the tolling cases). There are 25 tolling agreements, the
7https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/pls/
8https://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/plsa/index.html
9Based on Stevens and Nielson (1994), updated with Stevens (2011).
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mean length of these cases is 3 years and 10 months, with the maximum being 5 years and 3
months.
Only 35% of failed banks have been sued, although this includes the past three years (57
bank failures) where it is still possible that cases will be filed, this dramatically outstrips the
% of failed institutions that the FDIC (and the RTC) chose to sue the directors and officers in
the aftermath of the S&L crisis between 1985 and 1992.10 Tolling agreements only make up
16% of all sued banks. It is clear that the rate of sued banks declines from mid-2010, and given
the mean time to the decision to file and the relatively low proportion of tolling agreements,
it seems unlikely that this number will change too much for the 153 failures between Q2 2010
and Q2 2012.
Table 3 shows a summary of the failed and sued banks relative to the wider population
of banks and their regulators. FDIC regulates banks which are state chartered, but not part
of the Federal Reserve System, the OCC regulates federally chartered banks and the Federal
Reserve regulates state chartered banks that are part of the Federal Reserve System. It would
appear that smaller state chartered banks that are not part of the Federal Reserve System are
disproportionately more likely to fail and to be sued, but there does not appear to be a pattern
in the breakdown by regulator for the failed and sued banks.
Table 4 shows financial data on the wider universe of banks in Q1 2007 and Q1 2015 and
for failed and sued banks. It shows some substantial differences between the failed and sued
banks such as capital ratios (better for sued than failed), cash ratio (better for failed than for
sued).
10https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/pls/
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3 Empirical Methods
The FDIC is the most likely litigant against directors and officers. The standard of proof
required by FIRREA is of gross negligence. From the experience of civil cases against S&Ls,
the FDIC set out the following criteria: “No claim is pursued by the FDIC unless it meets both
requirements of a two part test. First, the claim must be sound on its merits, and the receiver
must be more than likely to succeed in any litigation necessary to collect on the claim. Second,
it must be cost effective, considering liability insurance coverage and personal assets held by
the defendant.”11
What is meant by “likely to succeed”? Essentially, that the agents must breach a duty of
care. Outside directors are not meant to be second guessed by the regulator ex post and the
Business Judgment Rule applies: “Directors and officers are generally protected from liability if
they have acted in good faith and with due care, and if they have made fully informed business
decisions within the scope of their authority and without personal interest or self-dealing."12
Our hypothesis is that the FDIC pursues gamblers for resurrection and not merely “deep
pockets”. It is thus imposing a retrospective duty of care to deposit holders and a requirement
that the directors and officers focus on the safety and stability of the financial institution. The
null hypothesis is that of no difference, other than bank size or the FDIC loss, between cases
where directors and officers are sued and where they were not.
To investigate this hypothesis we conduct a series of tests. First, we compare balance sheet
ratio means in the run-up of the failure between banks subject to litigation and failed banks
whose directors and officers did not get sued. Second, we estimate a logistic model among
the population of all failed banks to seek characteristics that, conditional on failing, would
predict whether or not the FDIC pursues litigation against directors and officers. Third, we
estimate a Cox proportional hazard model on the population of U.S. commercial banks to test
whether failure and litigation by the FDIC are unconditionally predictable. For all three tests,
we employ a subset of the “director’s dozen" of monitoring tools given by the FDIC.13
The first test consists of indexing the calendar time balance sheet dynamics relative to
11FDIC (1998) Managing the crisis.
12FDIC (1998) p. 275 and FDIC Financial Institution Letter (FIL-87-92) note 5.
13FDIC “New Director Guidance" presentation from NY FDIC Director’s college. Slide 19.
Downloaded from https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/director/college/ny/materials/
2012-New-Directors.pdf. These are more detailed measures based on the Pocket Guide for Directors found at:
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/director/pocket/index.html
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failure time (t = 0) and statistically testing differences in the run-up dynamics of important
balance sheet ratios prior to failure. We visualize moments of those ratios and statistically test
for difference in the means of the banks that (failed and) were sued against those that (merely)
failed, but did not become subject to litigation.
Second, an important disadvantage of the failure-time indexed mean comparisons is that
they are univariate. Thus, we employ a multivariate nonlinear logistic regression to simulta-
neously control for multiple balance sheet characteristics as well as other factors such as time
and the different U.S. state-level standards for litigation. We explicitly include the (log of) bank
total assets as well as FDIC loss to ensure that the “deep pockets only” hypothesis is nested.
Using the same time horizon as in the univariate failure-time indexed mean comparisons, we
estimate the logistic model in the twelve quarters prior to the bank failure.
Third and finally, the previous two tests confined themselves to the universe of failed
commercial banks, thus all estimates were conditional on failing. In our final test, we estimate
a Cox proportional hazard model with the bank level characteristics normalized by the mean
and standard devation of the respective quarter. So in each quarter, the expected value is zero
to circumvent the problem of macroeconomic environment-induced simultanteous changes in
balance sheets of all banks and focus on the within quarter – “peer group” – variation.
Our methods build on an extensive literature on bank failure prediction. Desai, Rajgopal,
and Yu (2013) specifically ask whether financial statement indicators predict failure during the
financial crisis. They find that many traditional measures that predict failure continue to be
informative. They build on the work of the FDIC (1997), which focuses on the loan-to-asset
ratio, Liu and Ryan (1995), the non-performing loans to total loans (NPL) and the composition
of the loan portfolio. Flannery and James (1984) and Avery and Berger (1991) capture interest
rate risk using the short term maturity mismatch of banks’ assets and liabilities. González-
Hermosillo (1999) uses the ratio of large certificates of deposit ($100,000 or more) to total
deposits to capture liquidity risk.
4 What Predicts Litigation?
All three tests discussed in section 3 find evidence that the FDIC is pursuing gamblers for
resurrection. We find a material difference between the banks whose directors and officers are
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sued and the ones that are not. We find evidence that the banks subject to FDIC litigation
are the ones that were more optimistic, underprovisioning for losses, and more aggressively
pursuing asset growth with riskier funding sources. In terms of timing, gambling appears to
have commenced approximately two to three years prior to failure.
Univariate Mean Difference
Figures 1 – 10 illustrate the dynamics of important “directors’ dozen” measures in the three
years (twelve quarters) preceding failure. Distinct patterns for failed and sued commercial
banks emerge.
Figures 1 – 3 demonstrate differences in risk-taking behavior. Figure 1 shows net non-core
funding rises for sued banks and those banks rely substantially more on non-deposit funding
(commercial paper and borrowing minus short term investments). The bottom panel of the
figure illustrates this difference becoming statistically significant from the eighth quarter prior
to failure. This extra funding helps to fund asset growth in Figure 2. Note that for the final
eight quarters the asset growth rate of sued banks is statistically significantly different from
that of failed, but not sued banks. Figure 3 shows short term liquidity (bank deposits and cash
equivalents), and we see an inversion between failed and sued banks in ten quarters prior to
failure and a statistically significant difference from eight quarters prior to failure.
Figure 4 and 5 show the results of this risk-taking behavior. The expansion is followed
by a gradual deterioration in the performance of the banks that are sued. In Figure 4, we
see that their net interest income ratio (interest income – interest expense) inverts with sued
banks seeing their income fall dramatically four quarters prior to failure. Sued banks, having
previously had net interest income above that of failed banks, by three quarters prior to failure
have statistically significantly lower interest income ratios. This is reflected in the deterioration
of the return on assets (net profits divided by total assets, ROA in the following) – Figure 5
– for sued banks, which having been higher than that of sued banks deteriorates from four
to five quarters before failure, becoming statistically indistinguishable two quarters prior to
failure.
Yet, sued banks give the appearance of being more financially robust, with Figure 6 show-
ing that sued banks have significantly higher Tier 1 capital ratios and Figure 7 showing lower
non-current loans ratios. It is especially noticeable in the period between quarters eight and
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two prior to bankruptcy when the sued banks Tier 1 capital appears to be statistically signifi-
cantly higher than that of failed banks. It seems likely that the aggressive expansion of failed,
sued banks documented in Figure 2 might have delayed recognition of the problem.
On top of that over-optimism might have played a part. Figures 8, 9, and 10 show the
sudden deterioration of sued banks just in the last year prior to failure. Figure 8 shows provi-
sions for loan losses rising dramatically for sued banks, with an inversion between sued and
failed banks four quarters prior to bankruptcy. Allowances for loan losses converge between
sued and failed banks the 3rd quarter prior to failure. Net charge-offs in Figure 10 show an
inversion in the period between one and two quarters prior to bankruptcy.
These univariate results suggest the FDIC is indeed pursuing the “right" directors and
officers insofar as the banks being sued likely have been following a riskier strategy.
Logistic Regression
How robust are the univariate failure-indexed mean comparisons? The multivariate logistic
regression in Table 5 confirms the results of the univariate mean comparisons. Furthermore,
while it yields evidence of the FDIC going after the “deep pockets" of the insurers, the table
shows that the FDIC is aiming specifically at directors who should have been able to determine
that their institution was running significant risks at least a year or two prior to failure.
The logistic estimation includes time, regulator and U.S. state negligence standard fixed
effects. The time fixed effects remove the effect of calendar time from the analysis. Relative to
other banks that fail, but are not sued, we continue to find evidence that directors engaged in
riskier strategies – delaying recognition of poor quality assets and relying more on non-core
funding. We learn that the FDIC also goes after “deep pockets”, because – as the last two rows
of Table 5 show (log of) bank total assets and the size of the estimated FDIC loss positively
impact the probability of getting sued.14 While both the size of the bank in terms of the log of
total assets and the FDIC loss are statistically significant at the 1% level, they are not the only
variables that attain significance. There does not appear to be a "too-small-to-get-sued".
In line with many of the univariate failure-indexed mean comparisons, we find that banks
whose directors and officers are sued appear to have better ROA and Tier 1 capital than
banks that are not subject to litigation. The ROA ceases to be statistically significant two
14Note that, unlike the other co-variates, estimated FDIC loss is not time-varying.
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quarters prior to failure. We also see a gradual rise in the predictive power of allowances for
loan losses amongst banks subject to litigation five quarters prior to failure. One difference
with the univariate analysis is that the asset growth rate is no longer consistently statistically
significant, although it remains positive and is significant in some quarters. The increased
riskiness of funding sources remains consistent with the univariate analysis, with net non-
core funding dependence remaining statistically significant at the 1% level for nine quarters
prior to failure for banks subject to litigation.
Cox Proportional Hazard Model
Are the logistic regression results useful guides for bank directors’ behaviour? Some of the
statistically significant results from the logistic regression “directors’ dozen" are not practical
for directors worried about litigation. Both a higher Tier 1 capital and ROA are associated
with a greater probability of being sued. Yet, healthy banks will also have high Tier 1 capital
and ROA. Therefore, these indicators are not helpful in and of themselves. This highlights the
limitation of the multivariate regression restricted to the population of failed banks. Thus in a
next step, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model on the population of all banks, failed
and surviving, to investigate whether directors can rely on the "directors’ dozen" to guide
their decisions.
We summarize the estimation results from the Cox proportional hazard model in Table 6.
Within the wider universe of all banks, banks that fail are more likely to do so with lower Tier
1 capital ratios (row 1). This is true for both banks that fail and whose directors and officers are
sued and those that merely fail. However, those banks seeing litigation have a lower coefficient
on this factor. Thus the risk of litigation relative to the wider universe of banks rise with a
fall in Tier 1 capital. As with the univariate means tests we find that asset growth (row 2) is
associated with the likelihood of litigation, albeit at the 10% level. The net interest income ratio
(row 9) and the net non-core funding dependence (row 10) are also associated with a greater
likelihood of litigation at the 1% level, although both measures are also associated with an
increased likelihood of bank failure without litigation.
We again find evidence that banks whose directors and officers are subject to litigation are
more optimistic than those banks not subject to litigation. A low ROA (row 8) is associated
with banks that fail, but are not sued, whereas this factor is not statistically significant for
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banks subject to litigation. A higher non-current loan ratio (row 4) is associated with banks
that fail, but are not sued, and we find that the second moment is statistically significant for
banks that are subject to litigation, which is consonant with the shifts seen in final year in the
logistic regression.
All three statistical models, univariate failure-indexed mean comparisons, logistic litigation
prediction conditional on failure as well as the proportional Cox hazard model, concur. The
FDIC appears to be pursuing directors and officers who should have been aware that they were
pursuing a risky and potentially negligent strategy: Underprovisioned, with more reliance on
net non-core funding and a higher asset growth rate.
5 Robustness
The results presented in the previous section 4 imply the FDIC litigates against agents that
gamble for resurrection. If such suits alter behavior, this should be apparent in the data.
As a robustness check, we consider looting as an alternative hypothesis to the gambling for
resurrection.
If our findings are correct, we expect that FDIC litigation affects the behavior of directors
and officers of banks in response. Table 2 shows a slowing in the rate at which banks are sued
amongst the banks that fail with a dramatic fall after 2010 Q3. This may reflect time specific
shifts in banks’ patterns of behavior. Therefore, we statistically compare the out of sample
banks that failed after 2012 Q2 for evidence of a shift in behavior. Table 7 contains the results
of this comparison. In general, banks failing after 2012 Q2 hold more cash and are financed
more through deposits. This is in marked contrast with the riskier financing (net non-core
dependency) of the banks that are sued.
One alternative hypothesis that would also explain the litigation against directors and
officers is the possibility of looting, along the lines of Akerlof and Romer (1993). Looters find
ways to extract cash from the banks in the knowledge that regulators and prosecutors will not
take action. It is difficult to distinguish between looting and gambling for resurrection, since
along many dimensions banks gambling for resurrection and looted banks are observationally
equivalent.
To test for looting we examine at the correlation of measures of potential cash extraction in
15
the financial reports. We identify the following measures that allow managers, directors and
shareholders to extract cash from the bank: Dividend payments, directors fees, extensions of
credit to directors, and the ratio of interest and fee income on loans and leases to total loans.
Desai, Rajgopal, and Yu (2013) use the ratio of interest and fee income on loans and leases to
total loans to look for evidence of Akerlof and Romer (1993) looting.
Akerlof and Romer (1993) suggest that looters are difficult to detect, but if their hypothesis
is correct, it is likely that looters would have extracted cash through all the above methods.
Thus, we expect the correlation between these cash extraction methods to be high for banks
whose directors and officers are sued. We do not find evidence of statistically significant cor-
relation in these measures. Table 8 shows the correlation between different financial indicators
as well as our looting proxies – dividend payments, directors fees, extensions of credit to
directors, and the ratio of interest and fee income on loans and leases to total loans – four
quarters prior to failure. While Table 8 merely displays the correlations for four quarters prior
to failure, we find no evidence up to 12 quarters prior to failure of a positive correlation in
the cash exactive measures. Also, the apparent change in behaviour of banks post 2012 Q2
suggests that banks had previously been gambling for resurrection rather than being looted.
6 Conclusion and Policy Implications
We ask who does the FDIC sue? The FDIC pursues directors and officers for gross negligence.
We show empirically that whether or not directors and officers of failed U.S. commercial banks
are subject to litigation ex post is partly ex ante predictable from a subset of the “director’s
dozen”. Our paper is the first to statistically analyze the FDIC’s motivation for and initial
effects of its litigation strategy. Our analysis suggest some degree of over-optimism in sued
banks’ directors about the state of their assets as well as signs of gambling for resurrection by
accelerating asset growth reliant on riskier funding sourcess.
From a policy viewpoint, the “directors’ dozen" tools appear to be useful, but could prob-
ably be made more useful still. In order to make them more informative for directors, it might
be helpful if each bank’s board of directors was to receive a report showing how their institu-
tion compared to similar institutions based on spatial proximity and size. While the worries of
the American Association of Bank Directors (2014) about the possibility that bank directors are
16
being put off by personal liability are important, more details about why bank directors and
officers are being sued – and the relevant statistics being provided – might improve corporate
governance further.
17
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Tables
Table 1: FDIC List of Directors’ Dozen
Name
1 Tier 1 Capital / Total Assets
2 Asset Growth Rate
3 ALLL/ Total Assets
4 Non-Current Loans / Total Assets
5 Net Charge-Offs / Total Assets
6 Provision ALLL / Total Assets
7 Earnings Coverage of Net Loss
8 Net Income / Total Assets (ROA)
9 Net Interest income / Earning Assets (NIM)
10 Net Non-Core Funding Dependence
11 Short Term Investments / Total Assets
12 Net Long-Term Position / Total Assets
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Table 2: Failed and Sued Banks by Time Period
Sued as Tolling Tolling as
Failed Sued percentage agreements percentage
of failed of sued
2007 Q1 1 0 0% 0 0%
2007 Q2 1 0 0% 0 0%
2007 Q3 0 0 0% 0 0%
2007 Q4 3 0 0% 0 0%
2008 Q1 2 1 50% 0 0%
2008 Q2 7 5 71% 0 0%
2008 Q3 10 6 60% 3 50%
2008 Q4 19 12 63% 0 0%
2009 Q1 21 13 62% 1 8%
2009 Q2 42 22 52% 4 18%
2009 Q3 37 15 41% 8 53%
2009 Q4 37 24 65% 2 8%
2010 Q1 43 21 49% 5 24%
2010 Q2 32 14 44% 1 7%
2010 Q3 27 6 22% 0 0%
2010 Q4 24 5 21% 1 20%
2011 Q1 19 2 11% 0 0%
2011 Q2 25 7 28% 0 0%
2011 Q3 18 4 22% 0 0%
2011 Q4 13 3 23% 0 0%
2012 Q1 15 1 7% 0 0%
2012 Q2 12 0 0% 0 0%
2012 Q3 8 0 0% 0 0%
2012 Q4 4 0 0% 0 0%
2013 Q1 12 0 0% 0 0%
2013 Q2 6 0 0% 0 0%
2013 Q3 2 0 0% 0 0%
2013 Q4 6 0 0% 0 0%
2014 Q1 6 0 0% 0 0%
2014 Q2 2 0 0% 0 0%
2014 Q3 5 0 0% 0 0%
2014 Q4 4 0 0% 0 0%
2015 Q1 2 0 0% 0 0%
Total 465 161 35% 25 16%
Source: FDIC
Notes: Failed banks are those that are taken into FDIC receivership as of July 31st, 2015. Sued banks are
banks whose directors and officers are subject to professional liability suits or who settle professional liability suits.
Tolling agreements are agreements that extend the three year limit on tort cases, these are derived from cases that
are filed after three years. Shaded area within the three year statute of limitations for cases to be filed.
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Table 3: Number of institutions by regulator and total number of failed and sued banks
FDIC OCC Federal Reserve Total
2007 Q1 All banks 4,782 1,704 977 7,896
Percentage 61% 22% 12%
2015 Q1 All banks 3,670 1,316 913 6,480
Percentage 57% 20% 14%
Failed 311 84 53 465
Percentage 67% 18% 11%
Sued 113 24 23 162
Percentage 70% 15% 14%
Notes: Failed banks are those that are taken into FDIC receivership as of July 31st, 2015. Sued banks are
banks whose directors and officers are subject to professional liability suits or who settle professional liability suits.
FDIC is Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, OCC is Office of the Comptroller of Currency.
Table 4: Summary of Bank Level Statistics
2007 Q1 2015 Q1 Failed Sued
Capital ratio 13 12.6 1.5 8.1
Cash ratio 4.4 10.4 10.3 4.5
Security ratio 20.8 22.7 9.9 12.1
Deposit ratio 80.5 82.7 91.8 82.7
Directors’ fees 8.6 19.7 5.6 14.1
Legal fees 11.6 87.6 231.9 142.2
Accounting fees . 34.5 52.3 66.7
Extensions of credit to executives 4,840.30 5,250.50 3,497.20 6,384.60
Level of auditing 2.6 2.5 3 1.9
Number of executives with large extensions of credit 1.5 1.4 2 2.2
Notes: Failed banks are those that are taken into FDIC receivership. Sued banks are banks whose directors
and officers are subject to professional liability suits or who settle professional liability suits. Summary statistics
are reported from 2007 Q1 – 2015 Q1. Ratios are reported in percentages. Fees and credits are reported in
thousands. Large extensions of credit are defined as amount that equals or exceeds the lesser of $500,000 of five
percent of total capital.
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Table 6: Cox Hazard Model
(1) (2)
Failed And Sued Failed Not Sued
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Tier 1 Ratio -1.764*** 0.181*** -2.674*** 0.185***
(-4.50) -3.39 (-8.85) -5.41
Asset Growth (4 Quarter) 0.568* -0.00095 -0.0385 -3.4E-05
-2.22 (-0.59) (-0.16) (-0.11)
ALLL Ratio 0.15 0.0203 -0.136 0.0900**
-0.76 -0.13 (-1.30) -3.26
Noncurrent Loan Ratio 0.0313 -0.0861*** 0.435*** -0.0232
-0.26 (-3.36) -4.77 (-1.42)
Net Charge-Off Ratio 0.425 -0.168 0.113 -0.167*
-1.57 (-1.80) -0.55 (-2.14)
PLLL Ratio -0.246 0.492*** -0.26 0.659***
(-1.19) -4.39 (-1.89) -6.42
Earnings Coverage of Net Loss 0.108 -4.7E-05 0.0788 -0.00035
-0.69 (-0.52) -0.22 (-1.23)
ROA -0.331 -0.0498 -1.647*** -0.186**
(-1.16) (-1.14) (-6.80) (-2.71)
Net Interest Income Ratio -0.826*** 0.211 -0.396* 0.0178
(-3.44) -1.27 (-2.24) -0.12
Net Noncore Funding Ratio 12.01*** -0.0177 8.742*** -0.0158
-6.1 (-1.40) -5.17 (-1.83)
Short-Term Investment Ratio -0.357 0.0179 -0.675*** 0.108**
(-1.49) -0.38 (-3.42) -3.17
Long-Term Debt Ratio -0.667*** -0.0631* -0.994*** -0.0269
(-5.18) (-2.12) (-9.37) (-1.26)
Observations 7733 7733
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Figures
Figure 1: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Net Non-Core Funding Dependence
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Net Non-Core Funding Dependence (Median)
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Net Non-Core Funding Dependence
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: The difference between noncore funding and short-term investments divided by long-term assets.
Noncore funding is the sum of time deposits with balances of $100,000 or more, deposits in foreign offices and
Edge or Agreement subsidiaries, federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase,
commercial paper, other borrowings (including mortgage indebtedness and obligations under capitalized leases),
and brokered deposits less than $100,000. Short term investments are the sum of interest-bearing bank balances,
federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell, and debt securities with a remaining
maturity of one year or less.
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Figure 2: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Asset Growth Rate
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Asset Growth Rate
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: Percentage growth in assets over the prior twelve months.
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Figure 3: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Short-Term Investments Ratio
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Short-Term Investments Ratio (Mean)
Ends in 2012 Q2
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Short-Term Investments Ratio (Median)
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Short-Term Investments Ratio
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: Short term investments divided by total assets. Short term investments equals the sum of interest-
bearing bank balances, federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell, and debt securities
with a remaining maturity of one year or less.
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Figure 4: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Net Interest Income Ratio
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Net Interest Income Ratio (Median)
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Net Interest Income Ratio
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: Net interest income as a percent of average assets. Net interest income is total interest income, plus
the tax benefit on tax-exempt income, less total interest expense.
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Figure 5: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Return On Assets
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Return on Assets (Mean)
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Return on Assets
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: Net income divided by total assets.
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Figure 6: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Tier One Capital Ratio
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Tier One Capital Ratio (Median)
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Tier One Capital Ratio
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: Tier One capital divided by total assets.
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Figure 7: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Non-Current Loans Ratio
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Non-Current Loans Ratio (Mean)
Ends in 2012 Q2
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Non-Current Loans Ratio (Median)
Ends in 2012 Q2
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Non-Current Loans Ratio
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: The sum of loans and leases 90 days or more past due, and loans and leases in nonaccrual status
divided by total loans and leases.
35
Figure 8: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Provisions for Loan Losses
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
PLLL Ratio (Mean)
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
PLLL Ratio (Mean)
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
PLLL Ratio
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: Provisions for loan losses (year-to-date from the income statement appropriately annualized) divided
by total assets.
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Figure 9: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Allowances for Loan Losses
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
ALLL Ratio (Median)
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
ALLL Ratio
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: Allowance for loan losses from the balance sheet divided by total bank assets
37
Figure 10: Pre-Failure Balance Sheet Dynamics – Net Charge-Offs Ratio
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Net Charge-Offs Ratio (Mean)
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Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Net Charge-Offs Ratio (Median)
Ends in 2012 Q2
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
 
Quarters Prior to Failure
Difference in Mean
90% Confidence Interval
95% Confidence Interval
99% Confidence Interval
 
Source: FFIEC; authors' own calculation, see Koch and Okamura (2015).
Net Charge-Offs Ratio
Ends in 2012 Q2
- Difference between Sued and Failed, But Not Sued Bank
Notes: Charge-offs minus recoveries from the income statement (year-to-date appropriately annualized)
divided by total assets.
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